Justice as Fairness: A Restatement

This book originated as lectures for a course on political philosophy that Rawls taught regularly at Harvard in the 1980s. In time the lectures became a restatement of his theory of justice as fairness, revised in light of his more recent papers and his treatise Political Liberalism (1993). As Rawls writes in the preface, the restatement presents "in one place an account of justice as fairness as I now see it, drawing on all [my previous] works." He offers a broad overview of his main lines of thought and also explores specific issues never before addressed in any of his writings.

Rawls is well aware that since the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, American society has moved farther away from the idea of justice as fairness. Yet his ideas retain their power and relevance to debates in a pluralistic society about the meaning and theoretical viability of liberalism. This book demonstrates that moral clarity can be achieved even when a collective commitment to justice is uncertain.

Since the work is essentially a restatement, any review must take into account the effectiveness of that which was restated. For this, I would like to mention one area that Rawls ammended; subsequently, I would like to comment on how this change provided a complete new hermeneutical framework for the book.

At its core, the theory proposed by Rawls is based on a Kantian understanding of human persons and human freedom. Any familiar with Kant's political philosophy will remember the concept of the 'transcendental self', the self that is so completely free of human encumberances and entanglements that he is actually and literally free. This person literally has an autonomous free will and consequently has the capacity to be completely self-legislating. This is, of course, necessary if a person is to abide by the categorical imperative. Kant believes that a person cannot be free unless his will--his capacity to choose--is grounded in something pre-empirical. Rawls seems to believe this too. However, he understands that the idea of the 'trascendental self' is so shrouded in the obscurity of German Idealism as to be unhelpful for the average person. So, he sets out to bring the self to the earth and give it an imaginable, even a empirical, basis. And this is the function of the original position: to bring Kant's 'transcendental self' to the earth and provide a basis for it. This should be kept in mind throughout the reading.

While I enoyed the book thoroughly, I have a number of issues. First, Rawls himself says that the work can be read independent of any prior knowledge, and I take this to be true. Nonetheless, reading Justice as Fairness without preliminary familiarity with A Theory of Justice is bound to make the reading considerably more difficult. The reasons for this are many, the most notable being that Justice as Fairness is a restatement of a theory presented in an earlier work. Its job, essentially, is to fill gaps, answer arguments, and provide clarification that lacked in the original version (not to be confused with the 'original position'). While Rawls alludes to the problems he intends to fix, it's almost impossible to fully grasp without a cursory understanding of A Theory of Justice.

In sum, the work is an excellent piece of analytical philosophy, one that is sure to be around for a while. Nonetheless, I would encourage anyone ready to dig into it to to read--or at least become familiar with--A Theory of Justice.

Adam Glover


Culmination of a half century's work on political philosophy   August 3, 2001
38 out of 43 found this review helpful

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Rawls' theory of justice, almost all contemporary moral and political philosophy takes place in its shadow. If not for A Theory of Justice, generations of grad students would still indulge in tired debates over the meaning of Kant's categorical imperative and whether analytic philosophy merely defines the words we use to talk about philosophy. Luckily, this was not the case and we now have this book that expresses the most refined exposition of Rawls' views on justice to date. Attempting to address the criticisms leveled by Sandel, Walzer, Habermas, and others at his initial theory, Justice as Fairness integrates the concepts of "reasonable pluralism" and "stability for the right reasons" (the core concerns of Political Liberalism, although not in those words) articulated in articles scattered throughout journals over a span of three decades with the comprehensive philosophical doctrine in A Theory of Justice. Whether he succeeds in fully rebutting their objections is certainly up for debate, but Justice as Fairness should be essential reading for anybody interested in the philosophical underpinnings of a liberal, property-owning democracy.

That said, I would agree with the previous reviewer that a reader should at least be conversant in Rawls' ethical theory as described in A Theory of Justice to get the most out of this book. However, to those uninterested in the evolution of his thought and how its shortcomings have been repaired, Justice as Fairness is still a momentous work and will probably be used in introduction to ethics or political philosophy classes everywhere.

An obligatory note, since another reviewer is certain to mention Nozick: Nozick eventually became convinced that the Lockean proviso of justice in acquisitional holdings did not possess the requisite stability that would ensure that liberties owed to free and equal persons would be preserved and recanted some of the conclusions in Anarchy, Utopia, and State. As for Hayek's brilliant works, nobody seriously disagrees with his thesis that central economic planning leads inevitably to abuses as state oversteps individual liberties and that the mechanism of prices in a free market is the best aggregator and distributor of preferences. I just don't see what this has to do with libertarianism. Hayek is too fine a thinker to be shoehorned into such a confining box.